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This article presents the problem of independent evaluation of remote electronic voting systems 
and provides a solution based on the internationally agreed certification standard Common 
Criteria. The authors first discuss currently available approaches for the standardization of such 
systems and then explain the foundation and background of their own approach. The main part 
describes our core security requirements of remote electronic voting in form of a Common 
Criteria Protection Profile (including the defined assurance requirements). Finally the 




The fast development and uptake of the Internet in the 1990s led to the transformation of several 
processes in the field of business (e-Commerce) and public administration (e-Government). So it 
was mainly a matter of time until the idea of legally binding elections over the Internet emerged. 
Since the Democrats have tested remote electronic voting in the US Arizona primaries in spring 
2000 [Solo04] more and more countries around the world tested and introduced legally binding 
remote electronic voting. The most prominent examples are the United Kingdom in 2002 and 
2003 [Hepp04], the Netherlands [RIES04], Switzerland [BrBr06], and Estonia [MaMa06] 
providing nation-wide remote electronic voting with its 2007 national parliamentary election. 
After the practicability has been proven, it is now essential to ensure that remote electronic 
voting is secure. The main problem with electronic forms of voting is their lack of transparency. 
You can always trace and track a piece of paper directly and thereby fully understand the 
electoral process by natural senses when using paper. In contrast, electronic media are per-se not 
observable without the help of electronic instruments. This leads to an increase in public 
discomfort and lack of trust in the new forms of voting [OoBe04; Voll05]. 
In order to ensure the reliability of their systems, election officials use to invite experts to check 
the e-voting systems1 for vulnerabilities. In general all experts use their own set of rules or 
requirements and the evaluation depth varies a lot. This leads to judgements about e-voting 
systems which are hardly comprehensible by third parties. Moreover, different sets of rules and 
requirements are not comparable. In order to understand and measure these rules and their 
implementations, standardized requirements, testing mechanisms, evaluation procedures, and 
observation techniques are needed. This paper presents a protection profile following the 
methodology of the Common Criteria (CC) [CC06]. It was written within the context of the 
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), in cooperation with the e-voting expert 




Discussions about the security of e-voting systems have often been led in a very emotional way. 
As long as we do not have a rigorous security model for electronic voting the security of an e-
voting system can never be proven but only perceived secure until proven otherwise. This is 
sufficient with respect to the falsification principle of Karl Popper. But it is not sufficient with 
respect to the trust of the voters in their system. In order to reach confidence of the voters, 
developers and election operators have soon started to develop requirement documents which 
have often emerged to real standards.  
Germany was one of the first to have legal regulations concerning the use and testing of 
mechanical voting machines. The „Regulation of voting machines” was set into place as a law in 
1975 and was changed in 1999 [DE99] to allow electronic voting machines as well. In the United 
States the use of voting machines is decided on a district level which makes national standards 
on those machines hard to push. Still the IEEE made an effort with the „Project 1583” [SCC05] 
to develop such a standard in the aftermath of the 2000 Florida experiences. After a controversial 
debate about the draft standard, it finally was turned down and the working group is still trying to 
deliberate on the controversial issues. With the establishment of the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC) in 2002 a new set of guidelines was developed in cooperation with the 
National Institute for Science and Technology that has led to the “Voluntary Voting System 
Guidelines” [VVSG05]. Recent discussions by the technical guidelines committee of the EAC 
concentrated on the inclusion of mandatory Voter Verifiable Audit Trails and recounts thereof 
into the next release of the VVSG [TGDC06].  
For remote electronic voting one of the first discussions around requirements was the working 
group set up by US President Clinton in 2000 [IPI01]. The report of this working group defined a 
number of quality criteria for remote electronic voting. In the succession of the Arizona 
experiment another project evolved: the election mark-up language standard. This has been 
developed by companies engaged in electronic voting under the umbrella of the standardization 
organisation OASIS [EML05]. The German testing authority for physical devices, the 
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), developed a criteria catalogue for networked 
polling stations in order to support the W.I.E.N. project [PTB04]. It uses a similar methodology 
like the one used for voting machines. The largest effort to come to a common understanding by 
a set of criteria for both – remote electronic voting and voting machines – has been conducted by 
the Council of Europe [CoE04]. With the help of delegates from all 48 member states it has 
                                                 
1 Note that e-voting comprises the usage of voting machines and remote electronic voting systems. 
developed a set of legal, operational and technical standards on electronic voting. It is the most 
comprehensive and universal international agreed standard to date. 
In Germany the scientific association for informatics (GI), decided in 2004 to introduce remote 
electronic voting as the main channel for the elections of their board of chairpersons. Based on 
the standards then available [CoE04; PTB04; SCC05], they developed their own catalogue 
[GI05] in 2005. In parallel to this development the GI established an expert group with the task 
to use the Common Criteria methodology [CC06] in order to develop a Protection Profile on core 
requirements for remote electronic voting based on the same standards as used for the catalogue. 
The idea to apply the CC was already proposed in [CoE04] but not executed. Participants 
included academics, as well as representatives of relevant bodies like the BSI and the German 
Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragter (data protection office). The BSI subcontracted the PP to the 
German research centre of artificial intelligence (DFKI), which jointly developed it with the 
expert group. A report on this work of the group was published in [GKMR06]. The application 
of the CC has three advantages compared to existing standards: First of all the methodology is 
word-wide known and accepted. Secondly, the evaluation depth is clearly defined and the third 
advantages is the possibility to compare different systems based on their evaluation report. 
Moreover, we do not provide just another list of requirement but we tried to combine all the 




The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC) [CC06] are an 
international standard (ISO 15408) for computer security. They distinguish between customers, 
developers and evaluators: Customers specify their security requirements, developers define the 
security attributes of their products and evaluators determine if products meet the claims. 
Independent of these three groups a certification authority certifies the related statements. The 
CC contains three parts: “Introduction and Common Model”, “Security Functional 
Requirements”, and “Security Assurance Requirements”: In addition, a Common Evaluation 
Methodology (CEM) is provided to exactly guide an evaluator. This makes the whole evaluation 
process very transparent. Customers specify their security requirements for a category of 
products – the so called Targets of Evaluation (TOE) – by developing a Protection Profile (PP). 
These requirements are independent of technical solutions. A PP has to a particular structure and 
go through a formal evaluation to ensure that it meets various syntactical and documentation 
rules as well as sanity checks. The evaluation is done by an accredited laboratory. Successfully 
evaluated PPs are accredited and receive an official certificate. For example, in Germany CC 
certificates are issued by the IT security authority BSI.  
The evaluation insensitivity of the TOE evaluated according to a PP depends on the chosen 
security assurance requirements (SAR). The CCs predefine seven test depths so called 
Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) whereby level 1 is the lowest and level 7 the highest level. 
Level 4 is the highest level for typical commercial products and includes the source code 
evaluation. Level 5 and higher require more and more formal specification methods. 
 
4. Protection Profile “Core Requirements for Remote Electronic Voting” 
 
This chapter summarizes the content of the current version of the Protection Profile. 
 
4.1 PP Introduction 
 
A Protection Profile starts with the introduction part which contains an overview of the TOE. It 
helps a potential user of the PP to determine whether the PP is of interest or not. 
Our PP relates to elections where votes must be cast secretly, but who has cast a vote does not 
have to be kept secret. It also addresses elections where it is intended that no voter is allowed to 
cast more than one vote (thus, not including re-voting) while one vote can contain more than one 
voting option; where the voters must be prevented from proving their vote; and where the 
calculation of intermediate results during the polling period must be prevented. Amendments to 
the list of eligible voters during the polling period are not dealt with. The only users involved are 
the election commission2, the voter and the intruder. The TOE covers the server-side voting 
software including the stored data like ballot design and votes and the client-side voting software 
if available (it is not barred to use the web browser on the client-side). 
 
4.2 Security Problem Definition 
 
The security problem definition describes the security aspects of the environment in which the 
TOE is intended to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be employed, i.e. 




T.UnauthorisedVoter: An unauthorised voter or a voter ineligible to vote casts a vote on the 
client-side TOE. (Motivation: he wants to manipulate the election result; exploited weakness: 
authentication process; target data: vote) 
T.Proof: A voter eligible to vote uses data on his client device that are produced by the client-
side TOE during the polling period to prove to a third party that he has voted in a certain way. 
(Motivation: He wants to prove to a third party how he has voted in order to be able to sell his 
vote; exploited weakness: files, messages or similar that the TOE produces on the client 
device. target data: vote) 
T.IntegrityMessage: A network attacker intervenes directly in the network in order covertly to 
delete messages or to amend them selectively while they are in transmission or to generate 
new messages. (Motivation: He wants to manipulate the election result; exploited point of 
attack: network; target data: any message) 
T.SecretMessage: A network attacker intervenes directly in the network in order to read 
messages relating to the election while they are in transmission (Motivation: He wants to 
break the secrecy of the election/extract identification relating to individual voters/manipulate 
the result of the election/calculate intermediate results; exploited point of attack: 
communication network; target data: vote/identification data) 
T.WrongServer: A network attacker redirects the voter to a hoax (election) server. Hence, the 
voter does not communicate with the authentic election server. (Motivation: He wants to 
manipulate the election result/extract identification data/calculate intermediate results; 
exploited weakness: network; target data: ballot data/identification data/vote) 
                                                 
2 In addition to the traditional poll workers, any technical staff including system administrators is a member of the 
election committee. These people needs to be nominated by the traditional poll workers. 
T.after-Integrity: A person who has access to the data stored on the TOE after the “polling period 
including vote count” phase, alters the polling period data in order to influence the result of 
any recount. (Motivation: The election result is manipulated. exploited weakness: the TOE 
leaves the data unprotected once the final whistle3 has been blown; target data: vote) 
T.after-ElectionSecrecy: Any person who has access to the data stored on the TOE after the 
“polling period including vote count” phase can find out how a voter has cast his vote on the 
basis of the data stored in the TOE. (Motivation: To breach election secrecy; exploited 
weakness: the TOE leaves the data unprotected once the final whistle has been blown. Target 
data: vote)  
 
4.2.2 Organisational Security Policies 
 
P.Cancel: The voter must be able to interrupt the voting process on the TOE and to retain his 
right to vote when doing so.  
P.EndElection: The election committee must be warned if they try to end the election before the 
final whistle time in order to prevent accidental, premature blowing of the final whistle. The 
election committee is still able to blow the final whistle prematurely.  
P.after-BallotBox: After the final whistle, no more votes will be accepted.  
P.ElectionSecrecyElectionCommittee: The election committee is not able to use the TOE to 
breach the secrecy of the election during4 the polling period. 
P.IntegrityElectionCommittee: The election committee is not able to add votes to the ballot box 
using the TOE. For our purpose the limitation to “using the TOE” is justified because of 
A.ElectionCommittee. Neither are they able to delete votes in the ballot box or selectively to 
edit them. In particular, no functions exist that allow the election committee to reset the TOE 
to its original state after the polling period has begun. Further, the election committee has no 
possibility to change the list of eligible voters to either allow a voter to cast more than one 
vote or to change authentication data. Moreover, they are not able to change the ballot data. 
Once the final whistle has been blown, the election committee can no longer initiate a restart. 
P.SecretElectionCommittee: The election committee does not get knowledge of the 
authentication data. In addition, it must be ensured that the election committee cannot 
calculate any intermediate results. 
P.OverhasteProtection: The TOE can only store votes in the ballot box that the voter has 
reviewed and confirmed. 
P.Correction:  No limit may be placed on the number of times that the voter can revise his vote 
before finally casting it. He must also be able to correct it after reviewing it. 
P.Confirmation: The voter receives confirmation from the TOE that his vote was stored 
successfully. This happens as soon as the vote has been cast and whenever the voter logs in 
again.  
P.Malfunction: The election committee must be able to recognise from the server-side TOE 
when a malfunction occurs. 
P.Log: The listed events must be logged and the election committee must be able to view them:  
• Storage of the election data at the start of the election,  
• System errors as well as other reductions in the operability of the server-side TOE, 
• Interruptions of communication, 
                                                 
3 The final whistle refers to the termination of the voting process and the availability of the voting application. 
4 Here during the polling period is enough because later on, the problem fits to T.after-ElectionSecrecy 
• Start and rerun of the election on the server-side TOE, 
• Blowing of the final whistle, 
• Start of the vote count, 
• Determination of the vote count result. 
P.OneVoterOneVote: It must be ensured that each voter can only cast one vote and that no voter 
unjustly loses his right to vote. This must be ensured especially in the case of aborts caused by 
the client-side TOE, the IT environment of the TOE or the network as well as malfunctions 
and restarts at the server-side TOE. 
P.AuthElectionCommittee: The authentication function of the TOE must be such that it supports 
a separation of duty between a minimum of two members of the election committee. The 
TOE’s functions can only be carried out once two members are logged in.  
P.StartVoteCount: The election committee can not initiate the vote count until the final whistle is 
blown. Otherwise the election committee receives an error message. 





A.Interface: It is assumed that the election data are properly and correctly installed on the TOE at 
the beginning of the polling period; that the ballot box is empty; that the election preparation 
phase has been correctly carried out and that the TOE is correctly initialised.  
A.Observation: The voter ensures that nobody is watching him while he votes.  
A.ElectionCommittee: The election committee accesses no data other than that on the TOE; i.e., 
it uses only the functions made available by the TOE.  
A.AuthenticationData: The voter knows how to deal with his means of identification and 
authentication and is consistent in doing so; in particular that he doesn’t allow them to fall 
into the hands of others. 
A.ClientDevice: The voter acts responsibly in securing the client device. It is assumed that each 
voter that installs or uses the client-side TOE does so in such a way that the client device can 
neither observe nor influence the vote casting process. This includes the assumption that the 
voter not manipulate his client device. 
A.ElectionServer: Protection of the election server against attacks that originate from the 
insecure network is provided.  
A.Availability: The robustness, the quality of service and the availability of the network and of 
the election server are assumed. 
A.ServerRoom: No-one other that the election committee, as appointed by the election organiser, 
gains entry to the server room or access to the election server for the duration of the polling 
period and until the vote count. 
A.DataStorage: The data storage hardware is functioning correctly. 
A.Clock: The correct time is made available by the server’s IT environment.  
 
4.3 Conformance Claim 
 
This PP claims conformance with CC Version 3.1 Rel. 1. It is CC Part 2 and Part 3 conformant. 
 
4.4 Security Objectives 
 
The specification of security objectives is divided in those for the TOE and for its environment.  
 
4.4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE (O) 
 
O.UnauthorisedVoter: Only voters eligible to vote who are unmistakeably identified and 
authenticated by the TOE may cast a vote.  
O.Proof: All data that the TOE makes available to the voter can not be used by the voter to prove 
his vote to third parties. 
O.IntegrityMessage: The TOE must verify that the content of the authentication message, 
identification data, ballot data, vote records and the confirmation cannot covertly be deleted, 
inserted, replayed or amended during transmission (between the client-side and server-side 
TOE). 
O.ElectionSecrecy: The TOE guarantees election secrecy during transmission; in other words it 
should not be possible to match the voter to his vote in plain text form. In particular, no 
conclusions about the number of crosses and/or their position on the vote, or whether it is 
valid or spoilt, can be drawn from the number or size of the messages. 
O.SecretMessage: The TOE guarantees the trustworthiness of the identification data, the content 
of the authentication message and of the vote during transmission. Finally, this is necessary to 
deny the network attacker the possibility of calculating intermediate results. 
O.WrongServer: The client-side TOE guarantees that it is communicating with the authentic 
server-side TOE and vice-versa.  
O.after-Integrity: The TOE guarantees that the polling period data and the result are stored 
securely on the TOE once the vote count has taken place. Any changes are recognisable. 
O.after-ElectionSecrecy: The data that remain on the election server following completion of the 
vote count do not allow anyone to see how a certain voter voted – especially encrypted votes, 
even where supplementary data such as decryption keys are used. A link between vote and 
voter may not be inferred from the order and/or time of storage of votes in the ballot box. 
O.Cancel: The client-side TOE offers the voter a possibility to interrupt the voting process on the 
TOE and to retain his right to vote when doing such a cancellation. 
O.EndElection: The TOE guarantees that the election committee does not accidentally blow the 
final whistle before the final whistle time. Following an explicit confirmation, the election 
committee is able to blow the final whistle prematurely. 
O.after-BallotBox: The TOE guarantees that no votes are accepted after the final whistle has 
been blown. 
O.SecretElectionCommittee: The TOE guarantees election secrecy on the election server during 
the polling period including the vote count. The election committee is not able to link voters 
to their plain text votes.  
O.IntegrityElectionCommittee: The TOE guarantees that the election committee cannot insert 
votes into, or delete or amend votes in, the ballot box. In particular, it guarantees that the 
election committee cannot reset the TOE to its original state once the election has started. The 
TOE guarantees that the election committee is not in the position to allow any voter to cast 
more than one vote and that the election committee can change neither the authentication data 
in the list of eligible voters nor the ballot data. It is guaranteed that a restart is not possible 
once the final whistle has been blown. 
O.SecretElectionCommittee: The TOE guarantees that the election committee cannot obtain any 
knowledge of the content of the authentication message. The TOE also guarantees that 
intermediate results cannot be calculated on the server-side TOE.  
O.OverhasteProtection: The TOE will only accept a vote if the voter has explicitly double-
checked and confirmed his vote. To this end, the vote is shown to him one more before the 
vote is finally cast. 
O.Correction: The TOE places no limit on the number of corrections a voter can make to his 
vote before he finally casts it. The voter can correct the vote after it has been displayed for a 
second time. 
O.Confirmation: The TOE allows the voter to check whether his vote has been stored in the 
ballot box. This means that the voter is presented with an on-screen confirmation once the 
vote has successfully been stored in the ballot box. Further, if a voter logs in again, the 
successful storage of his vote will be confirmed on the screen.  
O.Malfunction: The election committee can recognise any malfunction on the server-side TOE. 
O.Log: The TOE logs the events listed in P.Log and allows the election committee to view them.  
O.OneVoterOneVote: The TOE guarantees that that can cast more than one vote and that nobody 
loses his right to vote without having case a vote. The TOE guarantees the right to vote 
especially in the case of an abort. This can be caused by a voter on the client-side TOE, the 
client-side TOE itself or the IT environment of the client-side TOE. The TOE also guarantees 
that where malfunctions to the server-side TOE occur, as well as to any subsequent restart and 
the execution of such restart, no data are lost and nobody loses his voting right or is allowed 
to cast more than one vote. The secrecy of the election is also preserved in these cases. 
O.AuthElectionCommittee: The TOE possesses an authentication function that supports 
separation of duty between a minimum of two members of the election committee. Starting or 
ending the online election as well as initiating a restart requires two or more members of the 
election committee to be logged on. The initiating of the vote count is also conditional upon 
the same requirment being fulfilled. This provides a guarantee analogous to that of a 
conventional election where two members of the election committee can monitor one another. 
O.StartVoteCount: The TOE guarantees that the election committee is only able to initiate the 
vote count once the final whistle has been blown. 
O.VoteCount: The TOE guarantees, that all vote records that are stored in the ballot box after the 
final whistle has been blown are correctly evaluated (and, where necessary, correctly 
decrypted) and contribute to the result of the vote count.  
 
4.4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment (OE) 
 
OE.Interface:  The TOE voting process takes no account of the preparation phase; instead it 
relies on correctly prepared data. This includes in particular the election data, the 
identification data, the prepared ballot box and other data that might be necessary for the 
execution. 
OE.Observation: The voter can cast his vote without being observed. This is the responsibility of 
the voter. The TOE cannot prevent somebody from looking over the voter’s shoulder while 
he is casting his vote. 
OE.ElectionCommittee: The election committee accesses the data on the server-side TOE only 
through the the TOE. The election committee would be able to alter or exchange the TOE, 
which the TOE itself could neither diagnose nor prevent. 
OE.AuthData: Only voters are in possession of the identification characteristics and 
authentication characteristics necessary to participate in the online election as checking for 
possession of such characteristics is the only way the TOE can ensure that only voters 
eligible to vote can cast votes. 
OE.ClientDevice: The trustworthiness of the client device is the responsibility of the voter 
because the TOE is not able – nor does it have the authorisation – to scan the entire client 
device for malicious software nor to remove any malicious software from it. 
OE.ElectionServer: The election committee carries out its responsibility to secure the election 
server in order to exclude the possibility that a network attacker gains access to the server. 
This can be achieved using up-to-date security technology (including through the use of 
secure operating systems and isolation of the server-side TOE from other software); hence, it 
cannot provided by the TOE.  
OE.Availability: The TOE cannot influence the availability of the network. This must be 
sufficiently high to allow the voting process to take place. Likewise, the TOE has no 
influence on the availability of the election servers on which the TOE is installed. Server 
failure disables the entire election process, including the vote count and can call the final 
whistle time into question.  
OE.ServerRoom: This objective guarantees that no unauthorised person can gain entry to the 
election room and access to the election server. This is necessary in order to exclude the 
possibility of the TOE being altered or exchanged. The TOE can neither diagnose nor 
prevent such attacks. 
OE.Storage: The TOE uses at least the operating system and possibly other software – such as a 
database for placing votes in the ballot box – and, hence, is reliant on the correct functioning 
of this IT environment. Beyond that, no potential hazards eminate from the storage unit. 
OE.Clock: The server-side TOE can rely on the server’s system clock. This is necessary for the 
creation of reliable log entries and to establish whether the final whistle time has been 
reached. 
OE.WrongServer: The voter verifies that he is communicating with the correct server-side TOE. 
 
4.4.4 Security Objectives Rationale 
 
In [PP07] it is specified which threats are averted and which security policies are ensured by 
which security objective and which assumptions matches which OE. 
 
4.5 Security Requirements 
 
The security requirements as part of the PP defines the detailed IT security requirements to be 
satisfied by the TOE or its environment. The requirements are predefined in the CC-catalogue. 
 
4.5.1 Security Functional Requirements 
 
The security functional requirements needed to cover all organisational security policies are: 
FAU_GEN.1 Security audit data generation; FAU_SAR.1 Security audit review; FDP_DAU.1 
Data authentication; FDP_IFC.1 Information flow control policy; FDP_IFF.1 Information flow 
control functions; FDP_RIP.1 Residual information protection; FDP_UCT.1 Inter-TSF user data 
confidentiality transfer protection; FDP_UIT.1 Inter-TSF user data integrity transfer protection; 
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition; FIA_UAU.1/2 User authentication; FIA_UID.1/2 User 
identification; FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding; FMT_MSA.3 Management of security 
attributes; FPR_ANO.1 Anonymity; FPR_UNL.1 Unlinkability; FPT_RCV.1/4 Trusted 
recovery; FPT_TST.1 TSF self test; FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path.  
 
4.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements 
 
The requirements for trustworthiness which the TOE must fulfil contain the components of 
trustworthiness level EAL 2 augmented from section three of the Common Criteria. The 
augmented classes are: ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls, ALC_CMS.3 Implementation 
representation CM coverage, ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures, ALC_LCD.1 
Developer defined life-cycle model. 
 
4.5.3 Security Requirements Rationale  
 




The development of the PP was driven by regular feedback rounds with experts of different 
organisations including universities, ministries, administrations, product developers and data 
protection authorities. Major issues were the level of the EAL, whether to include or exclude 
observation, the point in time of voter’s authentication within the electoral process, and the 
assumptions for the client’s trustworthiness. 
A general problem of a protection profile is the assignment of threats: which threats are specified 
as threats against the system and must be encountered by the Target of Evaluation, and which 
threats are shifted into “assumptions on the environment”? For example, we have decided not to 
require any security mechanisms of a remote electronic voting product against attacks on clients. 
Clients are assumed to be safe and secure. This is particularly manifested by the assumption 
A.AuthenticationData. This assumption is not globally realistic. However, the violation of this 
assumption does not affect the whole system, but only single clients. A voting procedure as a 
whole remains correct and other voters are not affected if this assumptionis not met in singular 
cases. The responsibility for safe and secure clients can be decentralized among the clients and 
the voting provider can help the clients with security manuals.  
Another problem is the granularity of the protection profile. For example, we have discussed the 
exact point of user authentication. There are arguments for having the authentication only once, 
namely when logging into the system. Reasons are usability and anonymity. Other arguments 
require a fresh authentication immediately before the submission of the vote to the ballot box. 
This is mainly to support the interception of a session, for example by social engineering. We left 
this point open and required more roughly that the system must make sure that there is no 
unauthorized voter. So, the decision about the authentication point is left to the voting provider. 
Some of the assumptions made in the assumptions section are questionable and need discussion 
especially for the application for Governmental Elections. For example, A.Observation has been 
widely violated in corrupt elections in the past. It does not threaten the value of the whole voting 
procedure that this assumption is not globally realistic, because it remains correct if this 
assumption is not met just in singular cases. Moreover, in traditional postal voting, the 
assumption A.Observation is as weak as in this protection profile. We decided to keep this 
assumption on the same level as the postal voting which is even accepted by legally highly 
protected governmental elections. 
A more serious threat to the whole system is a possible violation of the assumption 
A.ServerRoom, which requires that no unauthorised person has access to the election server. In 
fact, unauthorised modification of the service procedure may corrupt the voting result. The 
physical and digital access to any server lies outside the remote electronic voting product itself, 
which is a server application. Therefore, we shift this requirement to the voting provider as an 
assumption to the environment. For the duration of the polling period, physical entry to the 
server room must be controlled. Digital access to the server must be prevented by ordinary 
access control mechanisms like strong user authentication and intrusion detection and 
prevention. This is in the PP a duty of the service team. The separation of duty on the voting 
server side is not yet demanded but necessary to take into account. Therefore in [VoKr07] the 
application of k-resilience for the evaluation of online-voting systems in addition to the Common 




This article covers the procedures and discussions of the development of the Protection Profile. It 
contains the defined threats, the organisational security policies, assumptions, the security 
objectives for the environment and for the TOE as well as the security functional and assurance 
requirements. In addition to what a PP usually contains the group added an appendix with a 
guideline for the election authority how to conduct an election using remote electronic voting 
systems. 
The Protection Profile has been evaluated successfully by the testing authority Security Research 
& Consulting (SRC) in the first quarter of 2007 but needs the final certification by the BSI which 
is expected in the second quarter of 2007. Afterwards it serves as a contribution to the 
international community and can be used for certification of remote electronic voting systems in 
any country around the world that has adopted the Common Criteria. From our point of view, 
this contribution is a good starting point but needs to be edited and exchanged after having 
evaluated the first systems against this PP. There are currently two companies planning to 
evaluate their systems: Micromata and T-Systems.  
Currently, the proposed PP covers a kernel of security requirements which is essential for all 
applications, but it does not cover the full range of requirements for all applications. The kernel 
is already sufficient for elections in a private environment. However, for governmental elections 
it has to be extended based on further experiences to be made.  
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